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SUSTAINABILITY, SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND MANAGEMENT SIMPLICITY 
An Assessment of the Butwal Technical Institute’s (BTI) Approach to Cost- 
Covering Production Based Vocational Training 
John P. GRIERSON 
ABSTRACT 
Few development projects are designed with the objective of being 
partuzlly or wholly self-suficient. Recent research finds these few to 
be often overly complex in design and hence difi?ult to manage. 
Projects and approaches that assume both fund ratsmg and servtce 
dehvery roles increase considerably the management challenge that is 
inherent, and increasing& recognized as critic& in development. 
Production based vocational training programmes typically accept 
this challenge, probably in some innocence, when they combine the 
production management task of revenue raising with the educational 
management task of training. . 
The pressure to accept this challenge stems from the high cost of 
vocational training, the pressing need for vocational and skills training 
and the recognized pedagogical soundness of production based 
vocational trainin . 
disappointing. P 
In practice, however, the results have been 
his may be due in part to the management 
complexity of the cost covering production based model The 
management demands of both revenue raising through production 
and delivering training may overwhelm the pedagogical soundness 
and economic desirability of the model . 
Nepala Butwal Technical Institute (BTI) offers a rare example of an 
institution that has proven itself successful over more than twenty 
years while using a cost-covering production based approach to 
vocational training. A novel approach characterized by management 
simplicity may be the key to BTPs success. . 
The Cost of Vocational Training 
Vocational training is expensive. A Harvard Institute for International 
Development study of small enterprise promotion programrness categorized 
assistance programmes into six models. One of these, the ‘Training” model - 
programmes that “concentrate on providing jobs skills training for low income 
people” is characterized as “an expensive type of programme to operate” (Mann 
et al, 1989) Such programmes are fundamentally different from other 
development initiatives. Comparatively they require high investment per 
beneficiary flendler in L&t&y, Ed, 1989) and provide fewer social benefits to 
-. 
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the community (LaTowsky, 1989). A recent study conducted by the Cranfield 
School of Management for Britain’s Overseas Development Administration 
(ODA) found US$2,315 the average cost per trainee of a sample of thirty-three 
vocational training programmes (Grierson, 1988). Though the cost per trainee 
figure reported is from an unweighted sample from 18 countries it is thought 
useful as in indicator if for no other reason than that the literature generally fails 
to address the issue of specific unit costs. Most of the programmes surveyed 
were in Africa, Asia and the South Pacific; most were Non-Government 
Organization (NGO) based programmes targeted towards the small and micro 
sectors. Long term modem sector and high technology vocational training is 
thought to cost much more. 
The programme assessed here, the Butwal Technical Institute, is a ‘Training” 
model programme according to Mann’s definition, and one of the 33 
programmes surveyed by the Cranfield/ODA study. 
Vocational Training Costs in Context 
The programmes surveyed for the ODA study were for the most part in 
developing countries (31 of 33). Most were training people at relatively simple 
levels of technology for employment and 
sectors. Characteristically the facilities 
medium term. 
self-employment in the small and micro 
were modest and the training short to 
Even at this level of training the cost is substantial when considered in terms of 
the resources that the developing economies have available for training and the 
considerable and growing numbers of youth and others who need to be trained. 
Though the average cost per trainee determined by the ODA study, $2135, is 
modest in international terms it is more than fourteen times the per capita 
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annual income of $160 of poor countries such as Nepal or Bhutan (Luhan, 1987, 
Seibel in Imitsky, 1989). This “high cost of training” (along with a mismatch 
between offered and needed skills, urban bias, the oversight of new technology 
and external constraints) was cited as a principal constraint in a recent World 
Bank report investigating “skills training” support programmes (McLaughlin, 
1989). 
Developing countries particularly find that such costs are a considerable burden 
on limited national resources. The result is both limited facilities on offer and a 
degree of continued dependency on externally provided resources. The 
challenge thus posed is for developing countries to develop indigenous 
vocational training institutions and methodologies when they are faced with both 
a great need and the financial and management burden this need creates. 
Many attempts have been made over the years to meet this challenge with 
training models and programme designs that enable training institutions 
themselves to reduce costs and to cover all or part of the cost of training. 
A Variety of Approaches 
Two problems frequently emerge, often simultaneously; the costs of training 
need to be met (and sustained) and the management challenge of meeting costs 
while remaining focussed on vocational training needs to be mastered. The 
latter often goes largely unrecognized as a principal constraint. Both are 
particularly significant in developing countries characterized by a dearth of funds 
and specialized management skills. Approaches to cost-covering production 
based training often tend to focus on the funding problem - meeting or at least 
reducing the costs. 
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Low cost traditional approaches to production based training pre-date all 
modem development agency sponsored efforts. Traditional apprenticeships are 
the classic approach to production based vocational training and probably 
account for the vast majority of all vocational/skills training (McLaughlin, 1979). 
In traditional apprenticeships production is dominant and the production facility 
- the business - is the classroom. Many programmes have co-opted this 
mechanism. In most cases the goal is low technology, low cost relevant training. 
The Refugee Enterprise Development Project (REDP) in Somalia used this 
mechanism to good effect offering training at a low direct cost of as little as $50 
per trainee per month (Grierson & LaTowsky, 1989). While achieving 
impressively low costs this mechanism is not, of itself, cost covering and is of 
necessity strongly production not training focussed in that the business itself is 
the training venue. Further, as the REDP discovered, the model tends to be 
“supervision intensive and hence requires a fairly high standard of programme 
management” (Grierson and LaTowsky, 1989). Typically, as the REDP 
demonstrated, the quest for a mechanism that covers or reduces costs often 
results in a model that demands high standards of management. 
There is currently much interest in co-opting the self-help traditions of poor 
people and the dynamic potential of artisans, entrepreneurs and community 
organizations to provide skills training This approach places great emphasis on 
self-financing often through fund raising, savings mobilization and other 
traditional self-reliance mechanisms. While offering some hope such efforts are 
limited in scale, level of technology and cultural appropriateness (King, 1987). 
A recent Dutch study notes that the limitations of group and self-help 
approaches to development are often economic. As Verhagen pointed out in 
the Dutch (KIT/CEBEMO) study “the poor, while they remain poor, cannot 
afford to pay in full” for their own training (Verhagen, 1987). The poorer the 
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country and the target group the more limited the contribution of fees and 
similar self-help funding mechanisms. Can we reasonably expect a poor Nepali 
to pay fees equal to ten or fifteen times or more the per capita annual income in 
his country? High costs (and the inability of the recipients to meet these costs) 
remain a principal constraint. 
Correspondingly the management problem, albeit of a different nature, is also 
significant particularly for governments and development agencies. Group 
approaches do not seem to be applicable where traditions of working with groups 
do not exist and are, in any case, difficult for government bureaucracies to 
coordinate with and support (King, 1987). Managing the mechanism needed to 
provide the funding and provide training often proves, to both donor and training 
institution, to be the stumbling block (Morss and Gow, Eds., 1985). 
Over the years there have been many attempts to harness the potential of 
commercial enterprise to meet training costs. Such programmes usually sell 
goods or services with the intention of funding vocational training from the 
profits generated. Typically the goods or services offered are internally produced 
and directly related to the type and level of training on offer. 
Perhaps the most common commercial approach to cost-covering vocational 
training is production based training. Normally this involves “production units” 
which provide the training venue for the trainees while generating profits from 
sales to cover training costs. In general, as the well known example of the 
Botswana Brigades amongst others has demonstrated, production based training 
has not performed according to expectations (van Rensburg, 1980). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that typically, in production based training, 
production takes increasing priority as the production units struggle with the 
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demands of commercial production. Often training is reduced to addressing the 
direct needs of the production units or in some cases eliminated entirely. Many 
production based vocational training programmes require significant levels of 
subsidy to cover operating losses and training expenses. There are few, if any, 
known cases of unsubsidized production based training institutions that cover all 
or even most of their costs while retaining their essential character as training 
institutions. 
The relatively high level of costs is a factor as is the use of a basic design model 
that adds the burden of managing profit oriented production to training 
institutions that already face the considerable and very different challenge of 
managing vocational training. If, as is often the case, the need external subsidy 
then the already complex production-cum-training management matrix is made 
more complex yet by the need to manage the bureaucratic and financial aspects 
of the donor relationship. There is some evidence to suggest that the overall 
management requirement of such programmes is greater than these programmes 
can consistently meet (Morss and Gow, Eds., 1985). 
This common model of production based vocational training requires 
considerable management skill to master the many aspects - marketing, finance, 
personnel and so on - of viable, competitive commercial enterprise. While there 
is some evidence to suggest that poorly selected production lines and other 
factors are also constraints the complexity of the management model may be a 
more fundamental problem. 
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A recent IL0 assessment of four informal sector skills training programmes in 
Africa and South America found that: 
“...the relative success of these programmes, and of many others, is 
far more affected by the quality of their management than the 
details of their operations”. 
The IL0 report goes on the say that in training as in enterprise success “depends 
ultimately on good management” (Harper, 1987). 
Production based training may be simple in concept but it has proven difficult in 
practice. This is due in part to the complexity of management that production 
based training typically requires. 
The Management Burden of Pedagogical Soundness 
Few projects seem to recognize both the importance of the management 
component and the degree to which conventional production based vocational 
training presents a specialized and demanding management challenge. Fewer 
projects still incorporate this recognition into programme design. 
- 
The problem is a significant one. Many authorities and studies over the years 
have referred to the efficiency and effectiveness of linking training and 
production (Gant, 1979, Grierson, 1988, Loose, 1988, et al). This well 
established recognition of the merits of functional context of production based 
training can be expected to result in an expanding array of production based 
vocational training programmes. 
a 
Thus there will be a growing need to find models of training that incorporate the 
effectiveness of production based training while requiring only the relative 
efficiency and simplicity of training focussed management. A greater challenge 
yet will be to develop models that include the capacity to generate revenue 
internally. These models will ideally offer reliable and simple methods of 
meeting training costs while requiring only relatively simple, training focussed, 
management. 
The Butwal Technical Institute (BTI) offers an example of progress towards this 
elusive goal. 
The BTI Model 
Nepal’s Butwal Technical Institute (BTI) has evolved a creative, simple and 
perhaps unique response to the management challenge of cost-covering 
production based training. 
The BTI is associated with a number of production units. Most of these are 
independent private companies who are tenants on an “estate” owned and 
managed by BTI. BTI itself has no direct responsibility for the management of 
the companies (“production units)” though it uses them as a principal training 
venue and currently (1987) covers 96% of it’s costs from the various fees they 
PaYa 
The revenue producing part of BTI’s management task is the relatively modest 
one of a landlord (with long term tenants) rather than the more demanding one 
of a production manager in a fluid and competitive commercial environment. As 
a result BTI has a secure funding base, a stable cash flow, and a simple, 
essentially training focussed management requirement. Overwhelmingly the 
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efforts and activities of BTI are directed to training. This training is for the most 
part in a commercially competitive productive environment that provides both 
relevant training and the revenue to cover training costs. Uniquely perhaps, 
virtually no “commercial” management responsibilities or financial burdens 
accrue to BTI as a result of the revenue producing “production based” 
relationship. 
Serendipity Rather Than Plan 
Though BTI is one of that minority of programmes that are intended to be 
internally revenue raising BTI was not originally designed to be cost covering 
based on the ownership and management of industrial property. 
Though BTI’s application of this method may be unique the concept of providing 
public services from income derived from property is not new. Sir Hugh Dalton, 
in his book on practical socialism, cites the interesting case of a small Canadian 
town that imposed no taxes and met all of it’s needs from property income 
(Dalton, 1985). There are no doubt many other examples of this methodology in 
practice but there is little evidence that it has been adopted by vocational 
training programmes.. 
BTI’s use of the income property concept was not foreseen and is still to a degree 
unappreciated. The land allocated to BTI was of little perceived value when it 
was allocated by the Government of Nepal more than 26 years ago. 
Nonetheless the result is the long term “endowment”, with non-cash assets, of a 
effective, respected and largely self-sustaining local training institution. 
Using non-cash assets such as land as seed capital to support vocational training 
has particular application in countries or regions entering a period of industrial 
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development. Land, which may have little current value, often has considerable 
future potential particularly if located in areas of projected urban or industrial 
growth. The BTI model offers developing countries an opportunity to plan for 
the long term future without incurring long term financial obligations. Too often 
such opportunities are forfeit to the need to address current problems with all 
available assets. 
The somewhat accidental evolution of the BTI model is not limited to the 
endowment of the land. Most of the tenant businesses used as training venues 
were originally affiliated production units of a type both common and 
unsuccessful in Africa and Asia. The separation of the production units, into 
private limited companies , appears to have been motivated by their best 
interests (and presumed potential) not that of the BTI. 
The net effect of both land allocation and production unit segregation has, 
however, resulted in an administratively simple, training focussed, successful, 
largely self-supporting vocational training institute - and a replicable model. In 
it’s current form BTI offers a effective low-cost model to developing countries 
who wish to support the establishment of vocational training institutions without 
recourse to the cash assets of the government, long-term recurrent expenditure 
obligations, external donor dependency, or debt. 
A Closer Look at BTI 
BTI was started in 1963 to help develop the light industrial sector of the town of 
Butwal and the surrounding area. Butwal is located in the Terai area of southern 
Nepal close to the Indian border. When BTI began Butwal was a modest 
transportation crossroads with very limited infrastructure, no industry and high 
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unemployment. A degree of credit is due to BTI for providing the economic 
stimulus and skilled workers that have helped develop the Butwal area. 
BTI was started by, and is owned by, the United Missions to Nepal (UMN), a 
consortium of most of the Protestant missionary organizations in Nepal. UMN is 
a large organization fielding almost 400 expatriates in a variety of areas including 
education, health and industrial development. BTI is administered as a private 
vocational training institute; the graduates are awarded a government recognized 
qualification. 
BTI was originally conceived as a production based training institute using a 
classic apprenticeship model with “production units” attached. The model 
remains essentially as originally conceived with the very important distinction 
that the original “production units” are now independent, though affiliated, 
private limited companies. Most companies used by BTI as training venues are 
owned, wholly or in part, by the UMN. There is a modest trend towards the use 
of non-UMN affiliated Nepali light industries. This trend will probably increase 
as the UMN affiliated companies absorb all the trainees they need and the 
bazaar based businesses increase their demand for BTI trainees. 
BTI has trained 197 young men over a period of 24 years and has 92 currently in 
training. Training is provided in a variety of woodworking, metal working and 
construction related skills. The output is modest and has varied considerably 
over the years. BTI currently graduates about 20 qualified skilled workers per 
year. Virtually all (96%) BTI graduates find employment, often at the 
supervisory level. Seventeen percent of BTI graduates are self-employed (New 
Era, 1987). 
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The BTI training programme is a classic four year apprenticeship programme. 
The trainees receive theoretical and academic instruction in BTI classroom 
facilities and practical training on-the-job as apprentices in the affiliated 
companies. The trainees live in supervised housing; full board is provided for 
the duration of their training. BTI assumes virtual in loco parentis responsibility 
for them. BTI’s cost per trainee must be seen in light of the considerable 
financial burden this represents. 
BTI’s training is not cheap. The BTI’s current cost per trainee is $2,536; more 
than the average of the ODA study sample and more than fifteen times the 
average annual income in Nepal. As Mann noted this high cost is characteristic 
of “training model” programmes. The fundamental distinction between BTI and 
most training model programmes is that BTI generates most of the funds needed 
to meet these costs. These costs are met from internally owned and managed 
assets. There is no burden on the government and little direct burden on 
donors. 
As will be discussed below there are several levels of hidden subsidy which 
somewhat qualify the success of BTI. Ironically, even these subsidies are 
probably unnecessary if the full commercial potential of the owned assets were to 
be exploited. The potential certainly exists for BTI to be fully cost covering 
without subsidy simply by making more efficient use of existing owned assets. 
A principal asset of BTI is the Nepali sa most of whom have been with BTI 
for many years. Staff turnover appears to be modest. Though all BTI staff are 
Nepali this is somewhat misleading in that there are a number of expatriates 
assigned to the companies that host BTI trainees. Their presence is not directly 
related to the revenue BTI receives from the companies but they must be seen as 
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both a hidden subsidy and a hidden presence. The 100% “Nepalization” BTI 
claims is thus somewhat qualified. 
A recent follow-up of BTI graduates found that 96% of all BTI graduates are 
employed or self-employed in fields related to the shills they acquired at BTI 
(New Era, 1987). BTI is deemed a success by the UMN, the Government of 
Nepal and the local business community. BTI was evaluated (by the author) in 
December, 1987. This evaluation confirmed that BTI is a success according to 
it’s terms of reference (Grierson, Jan., 1988). The Grierson evaluation 
specifically cited the simple management model used and the high standards of 
management demonstrated by the Nepali Director. 
The success of BTI may be due partially to it’s approach. A recent report for the 
Ford Foundation identified four “common traits” of NGO programmes that 
“stand out” when compared with other NGO’s involved in “livelihood, 
employment and income generation” (Tendler in L&t&y, 1989). The common 
traits Tendler cites are: 
1. 
: 
4: 
A narrow sector focus. 
A narrow activity focus. 
Links with powerful institutions. 
An urban setting. 
BTI shares all of these traits to a degree. BTI is very specifically focused on 
vocational training (in wood, metal and construction) for the light industrial 
employment sector in the Butwal area. Butwal itself is a small town but is 
certainly an “urban area” within the context of Nepal. BTI’s parent agency, the 
UMN, would probably not wish to describe itself as “powerful” but it is certainly 
a significant institution by any standard. 
BTI shares the common traits of successful programmes and has a management 
model which reflects most of these traits. The result is conspicuous success on a 
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modest scale in producing well training employable graduates with little donor or 
government dependency. 
The Essence of the Model 
However BTI’s real success story, that of evolving a cost covering 
administratively simple production based training model, has for the most part 
gone unrecognized. 
BTI has modest facilities and modest, largely internally generated, funding. 
Management is simple, direct and efficient. BTI owns very little industrial 
training equipment and no production facilities. BTI co-opts the facilities of the 
companies who accept their trainees. These companies pay BTI for the services - 
as productive workers - of the trainees. The significant component of the BTI 
model is that principal training facilities, normally a costly burden, are instead 
the principal source of revenue. 
BTI was designed to be cost covering and for the most part achieves this 
objective. BTI’s current budget is structured as follows: 
BTI 
Sources of Revenue (1987) 
Rent from Properties: 
Fees from companies (for trainees): 
Loan interest: 
Grants: 
Total 
43% 
32307 
4% 
100% 
Source: Grierson, Jan., 1988. 
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BTI owns the land which hosts the UMN complex of companies. This land is the 
source of 43% of the current budget. In addition BTI receives 33% of its income 
from fees paid by the companies (for the most part UMN owned in whole or in 
part) for the services of BTI trainees. BTI earns interest from loans to 
companies. These loans are not directly related to acceptance of trainees but to 
date have been made to UMN companies only. Loan capital is from a variety of 
sources including earned income and grants. 
Hidden Subsidies and Hidden Opportunities 
Most of the companies that employ trainees receive donor support. In some 
cases this is considerable. This results in several levels of hidden subsidy to BTI. 
Primarily, it results in the costs of expatriate experts, who are active participants 
in the apprenticeship training, being allocated to the companies and met by 
external donors. Their presence is probably desirable and necessary if BTI is to 
avoid simply recycling the technology of the local bazaar. Secondarily, donor 
subsidy to the companies provides some of the revenue that is understood will be 
paid to BTI as training fees. These fees are probably artificially inflated; 
certainly the UMN company managers think so (Grierson, Jan, 1988). In 
addition donor support allows, and in some cases encourages, sub-contracting 
between UMN companies and donors sometimes contract UMN companies 
directly for civil works and development projects. 
All of these are balanced to a degree by the reverse subsidy BTI provides to the 
host companies. The rents BTI charges the host companies, BTI’s single most 
important source of revenue, are clearly sub-economic (Grierson, Jan., 1988). 
The potential exists for BTI to charge competitive rentals for it’s highly desirable 
industrial land, reduce the training fees it charges the host companies and pay at 
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least part of the costs of the expert technical imput needed to assure that BTI 
training continues to lead the market in the Butwal area. 
The lowering of trainees fees would enhance the already significant 
attractiveness of BTI trainees to bazaar based non-UMN businesses (Grierson, 
Jan., 1988). Both BTI and the bazaar could benefit from the increased degree of 
interaction. At present none of the bazaar (i.e. Non-UMN) businesses are 
currently based on the BTI “estate” though many could be as could many future 
businesses that might be started by BTI graduates. There is clear potential for 
increased (and future) revenue simply by expanding the degree of commercial 
interaction between BTI and the bazaar. 
Collectively, the available evidence strongly suggests that BTI has the potential 
to be cost covering at it’s present level of operation within the economic 
conditions likely to prevail in the Butwal area in the foreseeable future. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Production based training approaches, that co-opt the “functional context” (Gant, 
1979) of the market, are being increasingly recognized as efficient and effective 
(Grierson, March, 1988). High costs and management complexity are principal 
constraints limiting the potential of cost-covering production based vocational 
training (McLaughlin, 1989, Morss & Gow, 1985). Conventional approaches to 
cost covering production based vocational training demand very high standards 
of both commercial management and educational administration. However, as 
BTI demonstrates, cost covering production based training need not require 
direct involvement in the management of industrial production. 
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There is a great need to recognize existing successful models that utilize the 
management, market and capital resources readily available in developing 
countries. 
The example of BTI has shown that revenue producing production based training 
need not require direct involvement in and management responsibility for 
commercial production. Further, BTI has demonstrated that local resources and 
staff can provide long term effective efficient vocational training. Local markets 
can provide the resources; local management can use these resources to provide 
effective vocational training. 
The BTI model has particular relevance in developing countries. Though BTI 
had considerable donor support at the outset the principal resources of BTI are 
the land endowment, a locally provided non-cash asset, and the Nepali staff. 
Together they are the key to avoiding the much decried failure of sustainability 
that is increasingly being recognized as a failure of development (Morss and 
Gow, eds., 1985). 
Sustainability in vocational training generally means at least the ability to meet 
recurrent expenditure obligations equal to approximately 17% (in the case of 
“polytechnics”) of the investment outlay (Morss and Gbw, eds., 1985). BTI has 
made good use of donor and government support to develop the capacity to meet 
it’s recurrent expenditure obligations - and demonstrate it’s sustainability. 
The BTI model demonstrates how a poor country can offer much needed and 
relatively expensive training through a locally managed and financed institution. 
The BTI model offers donors as well as developing countries a positive 
alternative to the all-too-frequent dilemma of deciding between dependency or 
deterioration. 
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The BTI model offers special opportunities to those planning the long term 
training requirements of new cities such as Islamabad in Pakistan and Lilongwe 
in Malawi. In such cases planners can take the opportunity to allocate the 
critically necessary non-cash (land) resources before they are absorbed by the 
process of industrialization and settlement. Replication of the BTI model can, 
with foresight beforehand and well managed implementation, ensure the long 
term sustainability of cost-covering production based vocational training. 
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